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Abstract of
.J

RECOMV£NDATIONS FOR A UNITED STATES POSITION
REGARDING DELIMITATION OF
THE OUTER BOUNDARY OF THE "LEGAL" CONTINENTAL SHELVES
The Convention on the Continental Shelf has corne under
attack because it does not establish a precise outer boundary for the "legal" continental shelf.

It is the author's

opinion that the United States should propose or support a
revision of the Convention which would rectify this situation.

A suitable delimitation proposal must have considerJ" ..

able domestic support and should represent the best compromise between opposing domestic views.

A proposed revision

of the Convention must, also ,have strong international support if it is to be adopted.

Each nation will determine a

preferred delimitation which depends on the configuration of
its own continental shelves and on the interest it may have
in exploiting the resources of foreign shelves.

Analysis of

the various domestic and international interests leads the
author to recommend that the United States, in order of preference, support the following delimitations:

200 meters/50

miles; 550 meters/50 miles; 550 meters; 50 miles; or 200
meters.

If it can be assured that coastal State rights in

the zone are limited to resource exploitation, support for
an intermediate zone extending to 2500 rneters/100 miles is
also recommended.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A UNITED STA'rES POSITION
REGARDING DELIMITATION OF

THE OUTER BOUNDARY OF THE "LEGAL" CONTINENTAL SHELVES
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background.

The coastal States of the world, in 1964,

gained the exclusive and unquestioned right to exploit the
natural resources of the seabed areas adjacent to their
shores -- that is, those resources located on or within
their continental shelves.

The rights of the United States,

in particular, were extended to an area approximately equivalent to that of the Louisiana Purchase of 180).

This re-

gion is larger than the State of Alaska and more than twice
the size of the original 1) states.

The right to resource

exploitation was derived from the Conventions on the Continental Shelf and on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone which became, effective, respectively, on June
tenth and September tenth of 1964. 1 These Conventions were
among the four major treaties which were adopted by the
participants in the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of

1Similar rights to resource exploitation were unilaterally claimed in the Truman Proclamation of 1945. "Proclamations Concerning United States Jurisdiction Over Natural Resources in Coastal Areas and the Hi~h Seas," The
Department of State Bulleti~, )0 September 1945, p. 484=487.
1

the Sea.

The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the

Contiguous Zone treats the seabed and subsoil beneath the
territorial sea (the inner continental shelf), while the
Convention on the Continental Shelf pertains to the seabed
and subsoil beyond the limits of the territorial sea (the
outer continental shelf).
Shortcomings of the Geneva Conventions.

The Geneva

Convention on the Continental Shelf has come under attack
because it does not specify a precise outer boundary for
the "legal" continental shelf. 2

It should be noted, per-

haps, that the inner boundary of the "legal" shelf is also
imprecise.

It 1s dependent on both the baseline from which

the territorial sea is measured and the width of the territorial sea claimed by the coastal State.

Although base-

lines normally follow the sinuosities of the low-water mark,
existing exceptions include the use of straight baselines. 3
Since baseline claims of many States are not widely accepted by others, and because there is no general agreement
on the width of the territorial sea, the inner boundary of
the "legal" continental shelf is imprecise in many cases.

2See page 7 for the definition of the "legal" continental shelf.
3Aaron L. Shalowitz, Shore and Sea Boundaries, Vol. I
(Washington: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1962), p. 27-30.
2

j

Limitations on the Breadth of the Analysis.

The au-

thor is of the opinion that the United States should favor
revisions to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone and to the Convention on the Continental
Shelf which would establish a uniform width for the territorial seas and a precise outer boundary for the "legal"
shelves.

The width of the territorial sea, however, is

excluded from this dissertation except for the possibility
of a tradeoff which would enhance international support for
the "legal" continental shelf delimitation determined to be
domestically preferred.
Another limitation on the breadth of this paper is related to insular shelves.

It is important to realize that

unless different rules are applied to islands, the governments of island territories will gain rights to resource
exploitation in huge areas which are completely out of proportion to the size of their dry land masses.

A delimita-

tion based on distance from the baseline, or one which includes distance as a criterion, would be particularly inequitable.

For instance, the government of a mere dot of

land, which just breaks the ocean surface at high tide,
would gain seabed exploitation rights within a circle whose
radius is equal to the delimiting distance. 4

One proposal

4A delimiting distance of 50 miles would yield a circular seabed area in excess of 7aOO square miles.

3

for eliminating this potential inequity would limit insular
"legal" shelves' to an area equal to that of the dry land
mass.

While it is the opinion of the author that delimita-

tion should be much more restrictive in the case of insular
shelves than in the case of shelves offshore from mainland
areas, analysis of that question is not undertaken in this
paper.
The "Legal" Continental Shelf and the Seabed Beyond.
It is not reasonable to establish an outer boundary for the
"legal" continental shelf without considering the differences in character between the two areas which will be separated by that boundary.

While national rights to resource

exploitation will prevail to shoreward, some degree of international control is likely to be established beyond that
boundary. 5

This international control may be exerted in an

intermediate zone, a regime for deep seabed resource exploitation, or both.

If a specific formulation of either

or both of these concepts is incorporated in a proposal for
delimitation of the "legal" shelf, many national attitudes
on delimitation may be influenced.

Although this analysis

5Arvid Pardo, quoted in Proceedings of the American
Society of International Law (Washington: 1968), p. 224-226;
Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources,
Marine Resources and Legal-bolitical Arrangements for Their
Development (Washington: 19~, p. VIII-)6j Commission to
Study the Organization of Peace, The United Nations and the
ped of the Sea (New York: 1969), p. 27-29.

4

is primarily concerned with direct domestic and international interests in the establishment of an outer boundary
for the "legal" continental shelf, the possible impact of
simultaneous consideration of a regime for the seabeds beyond that boundary is also given some attention.

Until

such a boundary is established, exploitation will inevitably be delayed in both the shoreward area of national
jurisdiction and the seaward area of probable international
control. 6

6Initial deep-water ventures are certain to be risky
in any case, but very little capital will be attracted to
the exploitation of seabed resources if the holders of that
capital cannot even be assured of the authority by which
their operations will be governed. (The mining of deep
sea mineral nodules represents a possible exception, however, since the exploiter may not require a long-term operation in a given area in order to derive an economic benefit.)

5

CHAPTER II
THE TWO CONTINENTAL SHELVES:

GEOLOGICAL VERSUS "LEGAL"

The Geological Continental Shelf.

The geological con-

tinental shelf is usually defined as the gently sloping
shallow-water platform which extends outward from the coast
to the shelf "edge."

At this "edge," the bottom commences

a relatively steep descent to the deep ocean floor.
steeper area is known as the continental slope.

This

The shelf

and slope are actually portions of the continent even
though they are sUbmerged.

They may be differentiated from

the non-continental ocean bottoms by the nature of their
subsoil.

The continental shelf and slope are characterized

by basically the same type of rock formations as the dry
continental areas.

The ocean basins, on the other hand.

exhibit considerably different geological composition.

The

average width of the geological continental shelves of the
world is about 40 miles, but the range of shelf widths extends from less than five miles to more than 700 miles.
Furthermore. the average depth of the "edge" of the geological shelf is about 1)2 meters, while there are kncwn
shelves which terminate at depths of less than 65 meters
and a few others that extend to depths in excess of 550
meters.

6

The "Legal" Continental Shelf.

In contrast to the

geological shelf is the "legal" continental shelf, which is
defined, however imprecisely, by the Convention on the Continental Shelf.

Article 1 of the Convention reads:

For the purpose of these articles, the term
"continental shelf" is used as referring (a) to
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the
territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the
seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. 1
The primary deficiencies of this definition are that
it is uncertain and varying.

That is, due to the "exploi-

tation" feature, it is uncertain at any given time because
it depends on the degree of technical development which
exists in the world at that time.

The degree of that de-

velopment may be known only very inexactly.

Similarly, the

area denoted by the definition varies from one time to another as technological advances are demonstrated.

In fact,

barring a firm interpretation of the term "adjacent," in
Article 1 of the Convention, the seaward limit of the
"legal" shelf will move progressively further offshore.
Some authorities have concluded that the Geneva Convention logically infers that all submarine areas of the

1"Convention on the Continental Shelf," The DeEartment
of State Bulletin, 30 June 1958, p. 1121-1123.
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world have been theoretically divided among the coastal
States. 2

That is, as technology improves, the claims of

coastal States will eventually meet in mid-ocean.

Other

authorities, while acknowledging that technologically advanced maritime countries appear increasingly oriented
toward claiming variously defined sovereign rights over the
ocean floor, up to the ocean median lines, conclude that
such a division is unlikely to be accepted by the international community.3

Authorities generally agree, however,

that the present definition of the "legal" continental
shelf will never be interpreted so as to precisely delimit
its outer boundary.

The International Court of Justice

did little to dispel this belief when it ruled, in connection with a North Sea continental shelf case, that by no
stretch of the imagination can a point 100 miles off a
coast be regarded as adjacent in the normal sense. 4

Un-

fortunately, no indication was given regarding what areas

2Shigeru Oda, International Control of Sea Resources
(Leyden, Netherlands: Sythoff, 1963), p. 167; American
Society of International Law, Whose is the Bed of the Sea?
(Washington: 1968), p. 219.
3Arvid Pardo, quoted in Proceedin s of the American
Society of International Law Jashington: 1968), p. 221;
Myers S. McDougal, "Revision of the Geneva Conventions on
the Law of the Sea - The Views of a Commentator," Natural
Resources Lawyer, Vol. 3, 1968, p , 26.
4Leo J. Bouchez, "The North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases," Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, October 1969,
p , 118.

of the sea could be considered as adjacent to the coast.
Furthermore, the ruling now brings into question the status
of shelf areas which are shoreward of the ZOO-meter 1sobath, but more than 100 miles from the coast.
The Feasibility of Revising the Definition of the
"Legal" Continental Shelf.

Whatever their interpretation

of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, most authorities believe that the deep areas of the ocean should be
treated differently than the continental shelf areas. 5

In

order to ensure such a development, however, it is essential that the Continental Shelf Convention be revised.

In

that regard, Article 13(1) of the Convention specifies:
After the expiration of a period of five
years from the date on which this Convention
shall enter into force, a request for the revision of this Convention may be made at any time
by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary General. b
Since the Convention has been in effect for more than five
years, revisions may now be considered.

In fact, numerous

revisions which would delimit the "legal" shelves have been
suggested by leading authorities.

Their recommendations

have included delimitation criteria such as geology, water

5Shigeru Oda, "Proposals for Revising the Convention
on the Continental Shelf)" 'rhe Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 7, 1968, p. 9-10.
6"Convention on the Continental Shelf," p. 1121-1123.
9

depth, distance from shore, and combinations of depth and
distance.

Prior to conaader tng the var-Lcus delimitation

proposals, however, it may be well to clarify the interest
of various domestic factions in the delimitation of the
outer boundary of the "legal" continental shelf.

<.;
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CHAPTER III
DOMESTIC

INTER~STS

IN DELIMITATION

OF THE "LEGAL" CONTINENTAL SHELF
Assumptions Concerning Domestic Interests.

A restric-

tive reading of the Convention on the Continental Shelf may
easily lead to the conclusion that delimitation of the
"legal" shelf must only be of interest to those who would
exploit the resources of the shelf.

Consider Articles 2(1)

and 2(2) of the Convention, for example:
The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.
The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of
this article are exclusive in the sense that if
the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources,
no one may undertake these activities, or make
a claim to the continental shelf, Wit~out the
express consent of the coastal State.
Furthermore, Article J provides:
-

.~

The rights of the coastal State over the
continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high se~s, or
that of the airspace above those waters.
In addition, Article 5(8) states:
The consent of the coastal State shall be
obtained in respect of any research concerning

1 11Convention on the Continental Shelf," The Department
of State Bulletin, 30 June 195$, p. 1121-1123.
2Ibid.
.,.-

/
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the continental shelf and undertaken there.
Nevertheless, the coastal State shall not normally withhold its consent if the request is
submitted by a qualified institution with a
view to purely scientific research into the
physical or biological characteristics of the
continental shelf, subject to the proviso
that the coastal State shall have the right,
if it so desires, to participate or to be represented in the research, and that in any
event the results shall be published.)
Articles 2(1) and 2(2) of the Convention would seem
to limit coastal State rights on the "legal" shelf to exploration and exploitation of the natural resources, while
only prohibiting other States, except when they have coastal State permission, from those same activities on the
shelf.

Furthermore, Article 3 specifies that the legal

status of the superjacent waters, and the airspace above
them, are not affected and Article 5(8) indicates that the
coastal State shall normally permit foreign States to conduct scientific research on its continental shelves.
In spite of the foregoing provisions, however, it is
assumed by the author that coastal State "sovereign rights"
may become "sovereignty" with regard to the shelf, or, at
least, that its jurisdiction on the shelf will extend to
the degree that it can effectively prohibit or restrict all
overt operations on its shelf by foreign States.

The au-

thor also assumes that coastal State "sovereignty" or

12

"effective jurisdiction" may eventually extend to the
water and air space above the "legal" shelf.
While other authorities would disagree, the foregoing
assumptions are supported by numerous writers.

They are

of the opinion that the implications of the Convention are
much broader than a restrictive reading would convey.
Schwarzenberger stated:
• • • any claim to the right of exclusive appropriation of the resources of the continental
shelf is the thin end of a dangerous wedge. It
is a covered claim to sovereignty over the continental shelf, and such claims easily degenerate into still more anarchic aspirations to
sovereignty over the continental shelf.4
According to Franklin,
It is difficult to see how the term "sovereign
rights" can mean anything less than "sover. ty,
" ••• 5
el.gn
Oda states:
. • • inherent in the adoption of the continental shelf is an inevitable modification of the
entire congept of freedom of the superjacent
high seas. b
.
The opinions of these

a~thorities

lead the author to

conclude that the foregoing assumptions regarding the

4Georg Schwarzenberger, quoted in Shigeru Oda, International Control of Sea Resources, p. 156-157.
5Carl M. Franklin, International Law Studies 1 5 -1960
(Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 19 1 , p , 47.
6Shigeru Oda, "Proposals for Revising the Convention
on the Continental Shelf," p. 19-20.

1.3

extension of "sovereign rights" to full "sovereignty" on
the seabed and its subsoil a.nd the eventual growth of this
"sovereignty" to include the superjacent water and air
space may be valid.

If this is an accurate assessment of

the situation, the coastal State, on and above its "legal"
continental shelf, could prohibit the military, scientific
research, and fishing operations of foreign States.

In

fact, coastal State jurisdiction in the waters superjacent
to the "legal" shelf has already been demonstrated by the
United Kingdom.?

Furthermore, Uruguay has recently de-

clared exclusive fishing and marine hunting rights in the
waters which cover their continental shelf.

A previous

decree by the President of Uruguay, on -Jul y 16, 1963,
claimed only the rights of exploration and exploitation of
natural resources of a continental shelf delimited by the
200-meter isobath. 8

If these types of jurisdiction become

generally accepted, extension of national authority to the
airspace above the "legal" shelf will inevitably be the
next goal of many States.
Domestic interests in the delimitation of the "legal"

?The United Kingdom's Continental Shelf Act of 1964
empowers the government, for the purpose of protecting
installations on its continental shelf, to prevent ships
from entering certai.n designated areas. Ibid., p. 2J.
8Presidency of the Republic of Uruguay, "Press Release No. 662/69 of Jf.ay 16, 1969."

continental shelf, then, are concluded to encompass military, scientific research, and fishing factions, as well as
the mining and petroleum extraction factions which are more
explicitly indicated by the Convention.

Before analyzing

the characteristics of various delimitation proposals and
the specific preferences of each faction, the basic reasons for their interests will be established.
Scientific Research Interests in "Legal" Continental
Shelf Delimitation.

Acquisition of knowledge is the most

fundamental of national goals in the sea because it determines the degree of success which will be attained in
achieving all other oceanic goals.

The discoveries re-

sulting from scientific research may enhance national security, stimulate the economy, increase the national capability to provide adequate food for a growing population,
yield the technology necessary to augment diminishing raw
materials found in dry continental areas, increase national
prestige in the world community, and improve the quality of
the environment.

Those areas of scientific research most

closely related to the question of delimiting the "legal"
continental shelf apply to national security, the fisheries industry, and offshore mining and petroleum extraction.

Each of these areas will be discussed separately.
It may be evident that the value derived from scien-

tific research increases as the area available for research

15

incr~rtses.

This is basically true because of the fact that

neither ocean waters nor seabeds are homogeneous.

From a

scientific research viewpoint, therefore, a relatively narrow "legal" continental shelf delimitation is most desirable.

The narrower the delimitation, the smaller the oce-

anic regions which can potentially be denied to scientists
by the adjacent coastal State.
Military Interests in "Legal" Continental Shelf Delimitation.

Although direct use of the seabed by the United

States Navy has been relatively modest, current uses include
the bottoming of submarines, the emplacement of various sensors, the conduct of mine warfare, and rescue and salvage
operations.

In the future, however, technological innova-

tions will undoubtedly permit the seabed to form a new
dimension in naval warfare.

It may become feasible, for

instance, to employ fixed, or mobile, ballistic, or antiballistic, missile platforms on the seabeds.

Other

po~si

bilities are submarine maintenance facilities, research and
communications stations, and storage depots.

These

increased capabilities for using the seabed will promote
more flexibility in the execution of naval missions.
The United States Navy has traditionally roamed freely
on, Within, and above the oceans of the world.

A radical

change in the present legal regime, which would restrict
naval operations in large areas, could disturb the
16

strategic posture of the United States.

From a naval view-

point, then, a narrow delimitation of the "legal" continental shelf would be most desirable.
Some may argue, however, that narrow delimitation is
not a valid naval concern because, through the principle of
reciprocity, the United States would obtain rights equal to
those of other countries with regard to its "legal" shelf
and the water and air space above it.

The United States,

however, must view delimitation in the knowledge that its
Navy is dominant in the world today and that, if sufficient
resources are committed, the nation has the technological
capability to maintain its naval dominance.

This being the

case, operational restrictions have a greater impact on the
United States Navy than on other navies of the world.

In

slightly different terms, if national jurisdiction in the
sea were to increase, the United States would lose more in
terms of deterrent, offensive, and distant-water defensive
capabilities than it would gain in domestic-water defensive
strength.
Fishing
tation.

Inter~~ts

in "Legal" Continental Shelf Delimi-

Worldwide fishing efforts are conducted primarily

in continental shelf areas.

These regions are most acces-

sible to man and, fortunately, environmental conditions are
such that the concentration of fish tends to be very high.
Although only about 7.5 percent of the ocean surface is
17

superjacent to continental shelf areas, about 90 percent of
the world's catch of fish is taken from those waters.
While it is apparent, then, that there are fishing
interests regarding the "legal" continental shelf, there are
two broad categories within these fishing interests.

With

regard to shelf delimitation, their interests are directly
opposed.

Distant-water fishing interests favor a narrow

delimitation which will enhance their opportunity to operate relatively close to the shores of foreign States.

In-

shore fishing interests, on the other hand, prefer a wide
shelf delimitation which may reduce foreign competition in
domestic waters.
Petroleum and Mining Interests in "Legal" Continental
Shelf Delimitation.

By the year 2000, despite increasing

reliance on nuclear power, and other new energy sources, it
is estimated that three-fourths of domestic energy requirements will be satisfied by oil and gas.

Since the rate of

consumption of domestic oil and gas is increasing more rapidly than new reserves are being discovered, a major problem facing the petroleum industry is to prove additional
reserves.

A growing proportion of the search for these

reserves is being extended to the sea.

Offshore oil produc-

tion among free countries of the world already accounts for
16 percent of total free world production and is expected
to exceed 30 percent prior to the end of the decade.
18

Although significant quantities of natural gas are not
yet being produced from domestic offshore reserves, it may
be essential to increase this production and to prove more
reserves in the near future.

The ratio of natural gas

reserves to natural gas production fell from 27 in 1950 to
less than 16 in 1968.

This ratio cannot continue such a

marked downward trend indefinitely or consumer demand will
not be satisfied.
The mining of hard minerals on the continental shelves
of the United States is of no practical significance except
in the case of sulfur, sand, gravel and oyster shells.
Furthermore, there are no domestic mining operations being
conducted in the deep ocean, so domestic offshore mining
can be discussed only in terms of potential.

It should be

noted, however, that successful ocean mining, in compara-

.~

tively shallow water, is being conducted in other parts of
the world.

.

,.~

.

I

Some United States companies are involved to a

small degree in these foreign offshore mining operations.
Furthermore, these companies, and others, have collectively
invested several million dollars in studying the potentialities of offshore mineral production.

The interest indi-

cated by this investment is eventually expected to lead to
significant domestic offshore mining.
Mining and petroleum extraction interests appear to
prefer a wide »legal" continental shelf delimitation.
19

While such a delimitation would assure huge areas of exclusive exploitation rights in domestic waters, it would also
limit potential operations by United States companies in
foreign waters.

A big factor in the preference for a wide

"legal" shelf is that it maximizes the exploitable area
which is under national control.

A narrow delimitation, on

the other hand, would probably subject petroleum and mining
interests to some form of international jurisdiction which
has not yet been established.

These industries appear to

prefer to operate under a relatively predictable national
jurisdiction than to be committed to an imprecisely defined
form of international control.
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CHAPTER IV
VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR DEI.IMITA'fION OF
THE "LEGAL" CONTINENTAL SHELF

Criteria for a Suitable United

State~

Position.

The

United States should propose or support a revision of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf, for the purpose of
delimiting the "legal" shelves, which at a minimum, would
satisfy the following criteria:
1.

It should be both certain and ascertainable. 1

2.

It should bear some reasonable relationship to the

geological continental shelf. 2
3.

It should have a considerable degree of domestic

support and represent the best possible compromise between
opposing domestic interests.

4.

It should have a considerable degree of known. or

potential, international support. 3

1That is, it should be unambiguous and a ship at sea
should be able to determine its location.
2Although not as critical as the other criteria, the
term "continental shelf" should be replaced by some term
such as "submerged area" if the criterion is not satisfied.
The latter terminology was considered and rejected by the
Internationnl Law Co~~ission, which proposed the wording of
the Convention, since "continental shelf" more adequately
described the area in question.
3Without this characteristic, a proposal is strictly
academic since its adoption cannot be achieved.
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General Characteristics of Various Delimitation Proposals.

Delimitation proposals are normally based on geol-

ogy, water depth, distance from shore, or a combination of
depth and distance.

The geological delimitation proposal,

which represents an attempt by scientists to translate a
description of nature into precise legal terms, is inherently appealing.

Except for the geological proposal, which

cannot be established without costly and time-consuming
surveys, all delimitation proposals have the common characteristic that their locations are easily determined. 4

All

delimitations based on distance from the baseline partially
equalize the benefits accruing to countries with narrow
geological shelves with those gained by countries with wide
geological shelves.

This partial equalization of benefits

is also a characteristic of delimitations based on a combination of depth and distance. 5

Another distinction of

using depth and distance in combination is that, if they are
paired properly, controversy between "distance" advocates
and "depth" advocates is eliminated.

4An outer boundary based on distance is most easily
established, while a boundary based on depth would be next
easiest to determine.
5The demarcation line would be established on a point
by point basis by whichever delimitation criteria, depth or
distance, occurred further offshore. Distance is measured
in nautical miles and depth is measured in meters throughout this dissertation.
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Elimination of Certain Delimitation tro.nosals from
Detailed Analysis.

In order to reduce the breadth and com-

plexity of the detailed analysis of delimitation proposals
which follows, certain proposals will be discussed, and some
of them eliminated, at this point.

The bases on which these

proposals are eliminated from detailed consideration include
impracticality, complexity, and failure to meet the criteria
specified at the beginning of this Chapter.
Before eliminating some of the alternative proposals,
it would seem reasonable to consider the definition of the
"legal" continental shelf as defined by the present Convention on the Continental Shelf.

Some shortcomings of this

definition were noted in Chapters I and II.

Its dismissal

at this point is £acilitated, however, by referring to the
list of criteria for a suitable United States' position on
"legal" shelf delimitation which appeared at the beginning
of this Chapter.

Unless the validity of these criteria can

be discredited, the present "legal" shelf definition, which
satisfies none of them, must be rejected as an initial
United States' position. 6
There does appear to be one circumstance, however,

6The deficiencies of the present definition with
rer,ard to criteria one and two were discussed in Chapters
I and II. The analysis of Chapters V and VI will indicate
that the present definition, though preferable to some
alt8rnatives, also fails to satisfy criteria three and four.
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in which the United States should support retention of the
present definition; that is, in the event that one of the
domestically acceptable delimitations, as set forth in
Chapter V, fails to gain sufficient support to be adopted.
In this case it would be in the national interest to support the present definition in order to delay, and perhaps
prevent, the adoption of a precise, but domestically unacceptable, delimitation.
In addition to the delimitation proposals which will
subsequently be analyzed in detail, a comprehensive listing
of proposals based on depth or distance would also include
the following:
miles. 7

600 meters; 1000 meters; 30 miles and 200

Delimitation at 600 meters or at 30 miles would

fail to satisfy the third and fourth criteria, while delimitation at 1000 meters or at 200 miles would fail to satisfy
all but the first criterion.

In view of their deficiencies,

these four proposals are eliminated from further discussion.
Delimitation of the "legal" continental shelf on the
basis of existing geological features has much inherent
appeal.

Two proposals for geological delimitation have

been made.

The first of these, delimitation at the geol-

ogical "edge", must be dismissed because it fails to
7Center for Naval Analyses, The Navy's Role in th~
Exploitation of the Ocean (Project Blue Water), Phase II,
(Washington: September 1968), p. 36.
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satisfy criteria three and four.

Furthermore, in ma.ny loca-

tions there is no "edge" between the continental shelf and
the continental slope, but a gradual merging of the one into
the other. 8
A second geological delimitation would include both the
continental shelf and the continental slope in the definition of the "legal" shelf.

The earth's mantel rises quite

close to the earth's surface under the deep oceans, while
true continental rock characterizes the areas below the continents and below the continental shelves and slopes.

Dr.

Hersey suggests that the point at which the mantel rises
toward the surface, and the continental rocks thin out,
might conveniently mark the outer edge of the "legal" continental shelf.9

Advantages of this proposal, as compared

with those which depend on other bases of delimitation, are
as follows:
1.

It .would differentiate precisely between the con-

tinental seabed and the deep ocean floor.
2.

It would avoid somewhat arbitrary water depth, or

distance from shore, specifications.

3.

Jurisdictional disputes related to common-pool oil

BShalowitz, p. 183.
9Center for Naval Analyses, p. 33.
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production problems would probably be avoided. 10
4.

It could be a final solution to the delimitation

problem because a coastal State has no "natural" claim
beyond the continental seabeds.
In spite of these

advanta~es,

and the inherent appeal

of geological delimitation, this proposal must also be dismissed.

First of all, the associated surveys would be too

costly and too time-consuming.

The primary shortcoming of

this proposal, however, is that it fails to satisfy the
fourth criterion -- that is, it lacks international support.
Only those nations which have wide geological shelves and
slopes would be likely to support this delimitation proposal.

These States are very small in number as compared to

the large majority of States whose self-interest would not
be served by this delimitation. 11 Therefore, this second
form of geological delimitation is also eliminated.
A suggested method of delineating rights to seabed
resources, both on the continental shelf and in the deep
oceans, is embodied in a "revenue-line" scheme. 12 Under

10Common-pool oil production problems are associated
with the fact that a single pool of oil or ~as can be tapped
from more than one location. Due to the marked compositional differences in continental subsoil as compared with
non-continental subsoil, a pool of gas or oil is not expected to straddle the boundary between the two areas.
11S ee Chapter VI.
12Center for Naval Analyses, p. 33-34.
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this scheme, the outer boundary of the "legal" continental
shelf would be delimited by some distance from shore.
Beyond this boundary, as within it, only the coastal State
or its licensee would be entitled to exploiting the resources of the seabed.

Outside the delimiting line, how-

ever, a portion of the revenue derived from resource exploitation would be placed in an international treasury which
would be used to benefit all nations.

As exploitation pro-

ceeded from the boundary of the "legal" continental shelf to
the mid-ocean median lines, the amount of the derived revenue to be placed in the international treasury would be proportionately increased.
The very complex "revenue-line" proposal does not satisfy criteria two, three, or four, which were expressed at
the beginning of this Chapter.

Furthermore, adoption of

this proposal could give coastal States effective jurisdiction, and potential sovereignty, as far seaward as the midocean median line. 13

Although revenue for an international

treasury would result, the potential extension of national
jurisdiction associated with the scheme would be sufficient
to make it unacceptable to most States.

The "revenue-line"

proposal, therefore, will not be included in the subsequent
discussion.

13S ee Chapter III.
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A restricted variation of the "revenue-line" proposal
forms one version of the "intermediate zone" concept. 14

Rather than extending the exploitative rights of the coastal
State to mid-ocean, however, this proposal would specify a
seaward limit for those rights.

Revenues produced would

belong solely to the coastal State, once again, as far offshore as the outer boundary of the "legal" continental
shelf.

The area beyond that demarcation line, to a seaward

limit for coastal State exploitative rights, would be known
as the intermediate zone.

A certain amount of the revenue

produced from resource exploitation in this zone would be
placed in an international treasury.15

This amount would

increase, on a graduated scale, from a relatively small proportion of the revenue near the outer limit of the "legal"
shelf to a maximum amount near the seaward limit of the
intermediate zone.

This intermediate zone is not discussed

SUbsequently because, like the "revenue-line" proposal, the
potential extension of coastal State jurisdiction associated
with it is considered unacceptable.
A second version of the "intermediate zone" concept
would also limit resource exploitation in the intermediate

14Lewis M. Alexander, "Alternative Regimes for the Continental shelf," Speech, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, R. I.: 6 February 1970.
15This treasury would be utilized to promote world and
regional community improvement.
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zone to the coastal State or its licensee.

Rather than

being sUbject to the jurisdiction of the coastal State, however, exploitation would be governed by whatever regulations
may be established by an International Registry Authority. 16
These regulations would coincide with those which may be
administered by an International Registry Authority within
a framework for exploitation of the resources of the deep
seabed which also is unestablished.

A portion of the reve-

nue produced in either of the two regions governed by an
International Registry Authority would, once again, be
placed in an international treasury.
The "intermediate zone" concept of the preceding paragraph would not result in a significant risk regarding the
extension of coastal State jurisdiction.

Furthermore, it

does not conflict with the delimitation criteria previously
set forth.

Depending on the limits specified, this inter-

mediate zone may satisfy all of those criteria.

It will not

be included in the detailed analysis of Chapters V and VI,
however, because it is considered to be a transitional
entity, between the "legal" shelf and the yet unestablished
regime for deep sea resource exploitation, rather than a
true proposal for shelf delimitation.

In other words, what-

ever the subsequent analysis of "legal" shelf delimitations

16Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, Our Nation and the Sea (Washington: 1969), p. 147.
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may yield, it is quite possible that an intermediate zone
may be appropriate in conjunction with that delimitation.
This possibility, as well as the simultaneous consideration
of a regime for the deep seabeds, will be treated in Chapters V and VII.
Specific Characteristics of Various Delimitation Proposals.

Table I lists the most prominent, and yet unre-

jected, proposals for delimiting the outer boundary of the
"legal" continental shelf and the percentage of the world's
seabed which would be enclosed by each boundary.

Each of

these delimitation proposals satisfies the first and second
criteria for a suitable United States' position on the matter.
The delimitation proposals of Table I are repeated in
Table II, where the degree to which each proposal satisfies
criterion two is specified.

Table II also includes other

basically desirable or undesirable characteristics for each
proposal.

These characteristics are not labeled as either

"advantages" or "disadvantages," although, in general, both
are included.

Labeling is not considered necessary in most

cases because the desirability or deficiency of the characteristic will be obvious.

In other instances, double label-

ing would be required because dimensional advantages to
"narrow shelf" interests are disadvantages to "wide shelf"
intp.rests and vice-versa.
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T,ABLE I

SEABED ARE;A ENCLOSED BY VARIOUS DELIMITATION PR.OPOSALS

'.

'.
~~

World Seabed Enclosed (% )

Proposed Outer, Limit
200 meters

7.5

550 meters

9.5

50 miles

11 .Oa

"

I,

'1
I'

I"~
I
I'

'"

':

r

1

:~

200 meters/50 miles b

15.0

550 meters/50 miles b

16.0

2000 meters

16.5

2000 meters/50 miles b

1 s.o

2500 meters

19.5

2500 meters/l10 milesb,C

2$.0

aThis value was estimated by the author since the
associated delimitation was not included in the source
cited below.
bThe outer boundary would be established on a point
by point basis by whichever delimitation criteria occurred
further offshore.
cThis proposal is considered interchangeable with the
2500-meter/l00-mile pairing which is frequently seen.
Source: Center for Naval Analyses, The Navy's Role
in th~ Exploitation of the Oc~a~-lE!gject Blue Water)J
Phase II, (Washington: September 1968J, p. 70.
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TABLE II
CHARACTEHISTICS OF DJ<.;LIIvlITATION PROPOSALS

Delimitation Proposala
200 meters

Characteristics
- Reserves largest amount of
seabed for exploitation under
a deep sea regime yet to be
det ermined.
- Enhances global operations
while restricting domestic
offshore operations.
- Coincides with average depth
of outer edge of worldwide
geological shelf, 132 meters,
more closely than do other
depth proposals.

550 meters

- A familiar alternative since
it was proposed, and Widely
discussed, at the 1958
Geneva Conference.

- Beyond man's current exploitative capability, so little
pressure for further revision would be forthcoming for
several years. (All greater
depths, of course, have the
same characteristic to a larger degree.)
- Would bring essentially all
of the geological shelf under
coastal State jurisdiction,
but goes well beyond the geological shelf in numerous
areas.
- Boundary occurs on the continental slope in most locations, so eventual claims to
the remainder of the slope
would undoubtedly result.
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TABLE II (CONT.)

Characteristics

Delimitation Proposala
550 meters (cont.)

50 miles

Would probably result in jurisdictional disputes over common-poolboil production on the
"shelf."
- Coincides with average worldwide shelf width of 40 miles
more closely than do other
distance proposals.
- Provides some benefit to
coastal States which have
little or no geological shelf.

200 meters/50 miles c

- Combines characteristics of
the separate criteria, but is
less restrictive than either.
(See Table I)

550 meters/50 miles c

- Combines characteristics of
the separate criteria, but is
less restrictive than either.
(See Table I) (Common-pool
oil production disputes on
the "shelf" would probably be
lessened as compared with the
550 meter delimitation. b)

2000 meters

- Near the outer boundary of
the continental slope. (A
"natural" boundary.)
Would largely eliminate common-pool oil production disputes on the "shelf."b

2000 meterS/50 miles c
2500 meters

- See separate criteria and
Table I.
- Near the outer edge of the
continental slope. (A
"natural" boundary.)
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TABLE 11 (CONT.)

Delimitation

Characteristics

Propo~s~a:l~a

----

_ Would largely eliminate common-pool oil productign disputes on the "shelf."

2500 meters (cant.)

2500 meters/110 milesc,d

Encloses all continental margins. (Would eliminate common-pool oil producti~n disputes on the "shelf."
(A
"natural" boundary.)
Considerable area is conceded
to coastal States.

aThe term "meters" refers to water depth, while "mile"
refers to distance from the baseline in nautical miles.
bComrnon-pool oil production refers to the fact that a
single pool of gas or oil can often be tapped from more than
one location.
cThe demarcation line would be established on a point
by point basis by whichever delimitation criteria, depth or
distance, occurred further offshore.
dThis proposal is considered interchangeable with the
2500-rneter/100-rnile pairing which is frequently seen.
Influence of the
tion Proposals.

Delimito. , of S"acific
...
.. ,---<-.._-

Characteristic~

It is likely that individual States will

establish a position on "legal" continental shelf delimitation which is in accordance with their national self-interest. 16 On the other hand, most States are unlikely to

16The self-interest of both domestic factions and foreign States is assessed in the next three Chapters.
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attain the adoption of their primary position because of
the opposing interests of other nations.

The inherent

appeal, or logicality, of the various proposals, expressed
in Table II, may be of some influence in the inevitable
compromising which will result.
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CHAPTER V
A

PRELIfJiINARY NATIONAL POSITION ON "LEGAL"
CONTINENTAL SHELF DELIMITATION

Review of Domestic Interests.

Before determining which

proposa.l for delimiting the outer boundary of the "legal"
continental shelf represents the best compromise between
domestic interests, those interests will be reviewed. 1
Briefly, they can be grouped into two general categories:
1.

Military, scientific research, and distant-water

fishing interests would be best served by relatively narrow
worldwide "legal" continental shelves even though foreign
States would be permitted to pursue similar interests in
correspondingly close proximity to the shores of the United
States.
2.

Petroleum, mining and inshore fishing interests

would be best served by relatively broad worldwide "legal"
continental shelf delimitation despite the fact that their
potential exploitative activities off foreign shores would
be greatly restricted.
1 ~s ind~c;;lt~d in ~he opening paragraph of Chapter IV,
th~ th1;d crlter1?n.wh1ch must be satisfied by a suitable

Un1ted utates pos1tl0n on "legal" continental shelf delimitation is that it have a considerable degree of domestic
suppor~ a~d represent the best compromise between opposing
domestlc lnterests. Chapter III provides the rationale for
the general type of delimitation preferred by each of six
domestic interests.
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Analysis of Domestic InterestS.

Table III expresses

the relative preference of each of the six domestic interests, previously identified, for the various delimitation
proposals included in Tables I and II.

Within each column

of Table III, for the domestic interest which heads that
column, each delimitation proposal is ranked from one, the
most desirable, to nine, the least desirable.

A superscript

letter "u lt indicates that the lack of desirability of a
given proposal is such that it is probably unacceptable.

2

The rankings assigned to each proposal in Table III are
in accordance with the general shelf-width preferences previously expressed.

That is, the preferences of military,

scientific research and distant-water fishing interests
rank, in order, from the narrowest "legal" shelf proposal to
the broadest "legal" shelf proposal, where the width in
question is based on the percentage of worldwide seabed
enclosed.

On the other hand, the preferences of petroleum,

mining, and inshore fishing interests rank, in order, from
the broadest "legal" shelf proposal to the narrowest "legal"
shelf proposal, where the width in question is based on the
configuration of the United States' seabeds only.

2Another way to view rankings which
" uI t ·~s t h at the domestic interest
column considers the associated proposal
the "legal" continental shelf defined by
Convention.
. t
scr~p
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In this

feature the superwhich heads the
to be inferior to
the present

TABLE III
RELATIVE PREFERENCE OF DOIvlESTIC INTERESTS
FOR THE VARIOUS DELIMITATION PROPOSALS

DOMESTIC INTERESTb

PROPOSED
OUTER LIl-':IT a

IvlINING

INSH.
FISH.

9u

9u

9u

2

a

a

a

3

3

7

7

7

4-

4-

4-

4-

4-

4-

5

5

5

3

3

3

2000 meters

6u

6u

6u

6

6

6

2000 m/50 mi

7u

7u

2

2

2

2500 meters

7u
gu

au

BU

5

5

5

2500 m/ll0 mi e

9u

9u

9u

1

1

1

MIL.

SCI.
RES.

200 meters

1

1

1

550 meters

2

2

50 miles

3

200 m/50 mi
550 m/50 mi

D/W
FISH.

PETROLEUM

aThe proposals are arranged in accordance with the
amount of worldwide seabed they enclose -- from the lowest
to the highest percentage. (See Table I.) Considered from
the standpoint of the United States' seabeds alone, the
2000-meter and 2500-meter proposals would precede the 200meter/50-mile proposal.
bpreferences of each domestic interest are rated from
one, most desirable, to ni.ne, least desirable. (See page 36
and Chapter III for the rationale which supports the relative preferences of each domestic interest.) Proposals
which are likely to be unacceptable to a domestic interest
are indicated by a rating with a superscript "u.1I
cThis proposal is conuidered interchangeable with the
2500-meter/l00-mile pairing which is frequently Seen.
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regard, it must be emphasized that the configuration of the
seabeds

adja~ent

to the United States does not conform to

the overall worldwide averare.

Specifically, off the coasts

of the United States the 2000-meter and 2500-meter isobaths
enclose less seabed than the 200-meter/50-mile pairing.)
Delimitation at 2000 meters, 2000 meters/50 miles, 2500
meters, or 2500 meters/110 miles is unacceptable to military, scientific research, and distant-water fishing interests because their activities would be prohibited in large
and critical areas -- the geological continental shelves and
continental slopes, and, perhaps, their superjacent waters.
Eliminating these delimitation proposals, only delimitations
at 200 meters, 550 meters, 50 miles, 200 meters/50 miles,
and 550 meters/50 miles remain to be considered from a
strictly national viewpoint. 4

The 200-meter depth delimita-

tion is retained in spite of the fact that, since it is more
restrictive to their domestic offshore operations than the
present "legal" continental shelf, it is considered unacceptable to petroleum, mining and inshore fishing interests.
It cannot be eliminated because territorial integrity and

3Lewis M. Alexander, "Alternative Methods for DelimShelf," UnpubKingston,

i~ing the ~uter Bo~ndarr of the Continental
l~shed Artlcle, Unlverslty of Rhode Island,
R. I.: 1970, p , 48.

4Chapter VI will indicate that the dismissal of all
other proposals can also be justified on the basis of international considerations alone.
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national independence, the primary interests of the United
States, are best represented by the military interest in the
foregoing analysis.

Although the 200-meter proposal is

retained, however, it is ranked lowest among the five remaining delimitation proposals because of the substantial
opposition it will

1 ~ceive

from domestic "wide-shelf" inter-

,j

ests.

The data of Table III would also appear to indicate

that delimitations based on a depth and distance pairing
represent a better compromise between opposing domestic
interests than either the 550-meter or 50-mile proposal.
Therefore, as a national position on "legal" continental
shelf delimitation, considering domestic interests only, the
five non-rejected proposals of Table III are ranked as follows:
1.

200 meters/50 miles

2.

550 meters/50 miles

3.

550 meters

4.

50 miles

5.

200 meters

Domestic Su£Port for an In~ermediate Zone.

In conjunc-

tion with any of the foregoing delimitations, from a domestic standpoint, an intermediate zone could be very appealing.
Specifically, it could provide additional domestic shelf
area on, and Within, which the right to resource exploitation would belong exclusively to the United States or its
40

licensee. 5

At the same time, domestic "narrow-shelf" inter-

ests would not suffer because their operations in foreign
waters would not be restricted on the seabed of the intermediate zone, or in its superjacent water or air space.
The most frequently discussed intermediate zone would terminate at the 2500-meter/100-mile point, whichever criteria
would give the coastal State the greater area for exploitation.

If a revision of the Convention on the Continental

Shelf were worded so as to negate the possibility of the
coastal State gaining significant jurisdiction in the region,
the intermediate zone concept would be highly desirable
domestically.
Domestic Support for a Regime for Exploitation of the
Natural Resources of the Deep Seabeds.

As indicated pre-

viously, the exploitation of natural resources seaward of
the "legal" shelf, within the intermediate zone or beyond
it, will probably be controlled by an international author-

ity.

In the event that a regime for the deep seabed area

is considered simultaneously with a revision of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the United States should have
an established position on the matter.

In this regard,

President Johnson stated:

5As indicated in Chapter IV, however, a portion of the
profits derived from resource exploitation would be payable
to an international treasury.
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Under no circumstances must we ever allow the prospect of rich harvest and mineral wealth to crea~e
a new form of colonial competition among the mar~
time nations. We must be careful to avoid a race
to grab and to hold the lands under the hieh seas.
We must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean
bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human
bed
e~ngs. 6
Furthermore, Ambassador Goldberg stated the United
States' position in December 1967, in the United Nations
General Assembly, as follows:
First, we believe that the prospects of rich harvest and mineral wealth both in the deep oceans
and on the deep ocean floors must not be allowed
to create a new form of competition among marine
nations.
Second, my nation believes that the nations of
the world should take ~teps to assure that there
will.be no race among nations to grab and hold
the lands under the high seas. The deep ocean
floor should not be allowed to become a stage
for competing claims of national sovereignty.
Third, we must insure that the oceans and the
deep ocean-bottoms remain, as they are, the
legacy of all human beings and that the deep
ocean floor will be open to exploration and use
by all states, without discrimination.
Fourth, my nation stands ready to join with all
other nations to achjeve these objectives in
peace and under law.?
In view of the recorded position of the United States,
and in order to ensure that the deep seabeds do not fall to

6Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, Our Nation and the Sea, p. 141.
7comm1s~10n
. .
.
on Mar1ne
Science, Engineering and Res o ur c e s ~ Mar1ne Resources and Legal-Political Arran~ements
or The1T Developmen~, p. VIIl-29.
"

f
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non-systematized and unregulated unilateral claims, the
author recommends national support for an international
regime for the deep seabeds.

As in the case of the pre-

viously discussed intermediate zone, a portion of the profits derived from resource exploitation would be payable to
an international treasury.

,.,

.:;,
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CHAPTER VI
QUANTIFIABLE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR
VARIOUS "LEGAL" CONTINENTAL SHELF DELIMITATION PROPOSALS

International Interests in Delimitation of the "Legal"
Continental Shelf.

Before determining the probable inter-

national support for each of the delimitation proposals of
Tables I, II, and III, various categories of international
interest will be identified. 1 With regard to the "legal"
continental shelf, these interests are as follows:
1-

States with relatively wide geological shelves.

2.

States with relatively narrow geological shelves.

3.

States which are "shelflocked."

4.

States which are landlocked.

Table IV lists each State in accordance with the nature of
its geological shelf. 2

'As indicated in the opening paragraph of Chapter IV,
the fourth criterion which must be satisfied by a suitable
United States position is that it have a considerable degree of known, or potential, international support.
2The criterion used here to describe a "wide-shelf"
country is that, for a significant distance along the coast,
the 200-meter isobath lies more than 50 nautical miles from
shore. If this is not the case, a coastal country is considered to have narrow shelves. "Shelflocked" countries are
those whose geological shelves do not extend beyond the 200meter isobath because of the proximity of opposite or adjacent States. Alexander, "Alternative Methods for Delimiting
the Outer Boundary of the Continental Shelf," p. 25.
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TABLE IV
DISTRIBUTION OF 'STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE NATURE OF THEIR GEOLOGICAL SHELVES a
STATES WITH
NARROW SHELVESb

STATES WI1'H
WIDE SHELVESb
Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Burma
Canada
China (Mainland)C
France
Guinea
Guyana
Honduras
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Ireland
?-J'~uritius

Mexico
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway
Pakistan
Philippines
South Africa
Soviet Union
Tunisia
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Vietnam (South)C

Albania
Algeria
Barbados
Bulgaria
Cameroun
Ceylon
Chile
Colombia
Congo
(Bra zza ville)
Congo
(Kinshasa)
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cyprus
Dahomey
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Equatorial
Guinea
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Kenya
Korea (North)C
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Korea (South)c
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Malagasy
Republic
lv"taldive Islands
Malta
Mauritania
Monacoc
Jvlorocco
Muscat and
Osman c
Nauru c
Nigeria
Panaro,
Peru
Portugal
Romania
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Southern
Yemen
Spain
Syria
Taiwan
Tanzania
Togo
Trinidad and
Tobago
Turkey
United Arab
Republic
Venezuela
Western Samoa c

TABLE IV (CONT.)
STATES WHICH ARE
LAND-LOCKEDb

STATES WHICH ARE
"SHELF-LOCKED"b
Belgium
Cambodia
Denmark
Ethiopia
Finland
Germany {East)C
Germany (Vlest)C
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Ma Lays i a

Netherlands
Poland
Saudi Ara bia
Singapore
Sudan
Sweden
Thailand
Vietnam (North)C
Yemen
Yugoslavia

Afghanistan
Andorr1. c
Austria
Bhutan C
Bolivia
Botswana
Burundi
Central African
Republic
Chad
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Laos
Lesotho
Liechtenstein c

Luxembourg
Malawi
Mali
Mongolia
Nepal
Niger
Paraguay
Rwanda
San Marino c
Swaziland
SWitzerland c
Uganda
Upper Volta
Vatican CityC
Zambia

aS ee footnote 2 on page 44 for a definition of each of
the coastal State categories.
bOf the total of 141 countries, 2S have wide shelves,
62 have narrow shelves, 22 are "shelf-locked," and 29 are
landlocked. Among the 124 United Nations members, 26 have
wide shelves, 56 have narrow shelves, 19 are "shelf-locked,"
and 2) are landlocked. (There are actually 126 voting members of the General Assembly, since Russia is in effect
represented three times. The three delegates represent
Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and the Soviet Union.)
CNot a member of the United Nations.
Source: Lewis M. Alexander, "Alternative Methods for
Delirriting the Outer Boundary of the Continental Shelf,"
Unpublished Article, University of Rhode Island, Kingston,
R. 1.: 1970, following p , 24.
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Analysis of International Interp.sts.

Each column of

Table V contains a ranking of various delimitation proposals
in accordance with the likely preference of the nation, or
category of nations, which heads that column.

The United

States and the Soviet Union are shown separately from other
"wide-shelf" countries because of their superpower status.
Their concurrence may be essential to any viable revision of
the Convention on the Continental Shelf and their influence
may be sufficient to gain adoption of a revision which would
not otherwise appear feasible.

Unacceptable proposals are

indicated by a flU," or by a numerical ranking with a superscript "u. ff
The United States' preferences in Table V are derived
from the analysis following Table III, while preferences of
the Soviet Union are based on the following assumptions:
1.

Military and scientific research interests of the

Soviet Union are similar to those of the United States and,
therefore, the last four proposals of Table V are unacceptable.
2.

Petroleum, mining, and fishing interests of the

Soviet Union are more global-oriented than those of the
United States and, therefore, these interests will tend to
reinforce their military and scientific research interests
in favoring a narrow "legal" shelf.
Preferences in the remaining columns of
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T~ble

V are

TABLE V
RELATIVE DEGREE OF INTgRNATIONAL SUPPOR'r
FOR THE VARIOUS DELUHTATION PROPOSALS

bpreferences within each category, in general, are
rated from one, most desirable, to nine, least desirable.
In the case of the United States and the Soviet Union, however, unacceptable proposals are not rated, but simply
denoted by a "U." Proposals which are likely to be unacceptable within the other categories are indicated by a rating with a superscript "u." Where unacceptability is particularly difficult to judge a superscript "u?" is employed.
cSe e the definitions in footnote 2 on page 44.
dTh i s proposal is considered interchangeable with the
2500-meter/100-mile pairing which is frequently seen.
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based completely on relative economic advantage.

In other

words, it is assumed that the overwhelming majority of the
nations represented in these last four columns do not have
sufficient military and scientific research interests to
override their domestic economic interests.

Therefore, each

State will prefer the proposal which maximizes its potential
economic advantage relative to that of other countries.]

If

this is the case, national preferences will generally be as
follows:
1.

Nations with wide geological shelves are most

likely to prefer delimitation either geologically, or by
water depth. 4
2.

Nations with narrow geological shelves are most

likely to prefer delimitation by distance from the baseline.
].

Nations which are either "shelf-locked" or land-

locked will prefer delimitation at 200 meters since they
cannot gain additional benefits from a delimitation beyond
. that boundary. 5
JThis is assumed to occur when a given State maXlm~zes
the amount of seabed to which it gains exploitative rights
as compared with the seabed area gained by other States.
4Geological delimitation, of course, was rejected in
the discussion on pages 24 through 26.

"j

5If they could reasonably expect the adoption of such
a delimitation, of course, landlocked States would prefer
that coastal States be totally restricted with regard to
rights on their continental shelves.
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Rankings assigned to the various delimitation proposals
in Table V are considered self-explanatory in the case of
"shelf-locked" and landlocked nations and the bases for
indicated preferences of the United States and the Soviet
Union have already been mentioned.

On the other hand, the

rankings associated with "wide-shelf" and "narrow-shelf"
States may require clarification.

In the case of "narrow-

shelf" nations, the 50-mile delimitation is preferred
because it would provide them with the same amount of seabed
area as that gained by "wide-shelf" countries.

Furthermore,

the 50-mile delimitation would mean that "narrow-shelf"
States would gain more seabed area than any of the landlocked States and more than most of the "shelf-locked"
States.

The 2500-meter/110-mile pairing is ranked second

among "narrow-shelf" preferences, but this ranking is certainly questionable.

Although this proposal might well be

ranked third, fourth, or fifth, however, the subsequent
analysis will show that it would be dismissed in any case.
Certainly the 2500-meter/110-mile pairing would rank ahead
of those proposals which are based on water depth alone,
since delimitations based on depth would result in significant gains for "wide-shelf" countries while yielding almost
nothing to "narrow-shelf" countries.

The three proposals

which pair various depths with the 50-mile distance criterion rank as shown in Table V because each would provide
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"narrow-shelf" countries with the same amount of seabed,
while competing tr'Y'lide-shelf" nations would gain as depth
increases.

Finally, delimitations based on depth alone mean

very little to "narrow-shelf" States, while their "wideshelf" competitors gain with each increase in depth.
With one exception, the ranking assigned to each proposal in Table V for "wide-shelf" countries can be justified
by simply reversing the
paragraph.

arglli~ent

presented in the preceding

The exception is the 200-meter ranking.

This

proposal is ranked lower than might be expected because it
would be more restrictive to "wide-shelf" nations than the
"legal" shelf which is presently defined.
In analyzing the data of Table V, it is essential to be
mindful of the voting power represented by each of the column headings.

Although this cannot be determined precisely,

a fairly accurate estimate can be made.

It is likely that

proposed revisions of the Convention on the Continental
Shelf will be considered at a future Law of the Sea Conference.

As in. the case of the 1958 Conference, which adopted

the present Convention, voting participants would probably
include the members of the General Assembly of the United
Nations as

w~ll

as those non-members which are invited by

the General Assembly.

There are a total of 17 sovereign

States which are not presently members of the United
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Nations. 6

It is not considered feasible to determine which

of these States would be invited and which of those would
then accept.

Realize, however, that such States would be

relatively few, compared to the 126 voting members of the
General Assembly, and that they are distributed fairly
equitably among the four different shelf categories of Table
V.

Therefore, since non-members of the United Nations could

not be expected to significantly affect the outcome, the
analysis of Table V will be based on the relative strength
of each geological shelf category as it is represented in
the General Assembly.

The United States would have one

vote, of course, but the Soviet Union, in effect, would have
three.?

"Wide-shelf" States other than the United States

and the Soviet Union would have 24 votes, while "narrowshelf" States, "shelf-locked" States, and landlocked States
would have, respectively, 56, 19, and 23 votes.
It is also important to realize that the adoption of a
revised Convention on the Continental Shelf would most
likely require the support of two-thirds of the voting participants at the Conference.

If each of the 126 members of

the General Assembly voted, 84 votes would be required in

6See Table IV on page 45.
?The three Russian delegates to the General Assembly
of the United Nations represent the Soviet Union, the
Ukraine, and Byelorussia.
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order for a revision to be adopted.

Alternatively, 43

votes would be sufficient to defeat a proposed revision.
By analyzing the data of Table V, many delimitation
proposals can be dismissed.

Proposals for delimitation at

2000 meters, 2500 meters and 2500 meters/110 miles, for
instance, can be eliminated from further consideration as
a result of their general unacceptability.

Since "narrow-

shelf" countries have 56 votes in the General Assembly of
the United Nations, and only 43 would be required to defeat
a proposal, delimitation by a water depth of 200 meters or
550 meters would probably be blocked by the position of
"narrow-shelf" States alone.

Therefore, only four of the

proposals in Table V remain to be considered; 50 miles, 200
meters/50 miles, 550 meters/50 miles, and 2000 meters/50
miles.

All but the "wide-shelf" nations would prefer to

adopt any of the other three of these proposals rather than
effect delimitation at 2000 meters/50 miles.

The latter

delimitation proposal, therefore, may also be eliminated.
It should be noted that the delimitation proposals
eliminated above could have been dismissed on the basis of
the ratings included in only the last four columns of Table
V.

The validity of the foregoing, assumptions rp-garding the

preferences of the Soviet Union, therefore, is not critical.
Furthermore, the fact that Table V does not specifically
rate the preferences of the United States and the Soviet
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Union for some of the proposals is of no consequence, since
all unrated proposals have been eliminated.
Another ramification of the analysis associated with
Table V is that the proposals which survived, 50 miles, 200
meters/50 miles and 550 meters/50 miles, were among the five
proposals which emerged from the discussion of Table III.
Therefore, the rather summary dismissal of four of the original proposals, in the analysis of Table III, is not critical to the overall discussion.
The final conclusion to be drawn from Table V is that
the interest of the United States, and "wide-shelf" countries in general, is opposed to the self-interest of the
other States considered.

These latter States, however, have

sufficient votes to gain adoption of a revised Convention on
the Continental Shelf which is in accordance with their preference.

In terms of international support, therefore, the

remaining three proposals must be ranked as follows:
1.

50 miles

2.

200 meters/50 miles

3.

550 meters/50 miles
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CHAPTER VII
NON-QUANTIFIABLE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR VARIOUS
"LEGAL" CONTINENTAL SHELF DELUHTATION PROPOSALS
"Legal" Continental Shelf Delimitation versus a Uniform
Width for the Territorial Seas.

The analysis of Chapter VI

indicated that the self-interest of over two-thirds of the
States which are members of the United Nations would be best
served by a "legal" shelf delimitation at 50 miles from
shore.

It is not considered necessary, however, for the

United States to abandon the domestically preferred 200meter/50-mile delimitation. 1 One reason that the latter
delimitation may still be feasible is that there exists the
possibility of a tradeoff agreement concerning the width of
the territorial sea.
Among the "narrow-shelf" and "shelf-locked" countries
listed in Table IV, 30 members of the United Nations presently claim a 12-mile territorial sea.

The United States,

the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and numerous others, have
refused to recognize the 12-mile width in favor of clinging
to the traditional three-mile territorial sea.

In view of

this prestigious opposition, many of the nations which

1Recall from Chapter V that three delimitation proposals, based on domestic interests alone, were determined to
be preferable to delimitation at 50 miles.
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claim the wider zone of sovereignty must find the situation
uncomfortable at best.
Whenever a conference is convened to consider revisions
to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, revisions to the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
will probably be considered also.

By agreeing to support a

12-mile territorial sea, the United States could probably
gain support, among the 30 "narrow-shelf" and "shelf-locked"
countries previously mentioned, for a tllegal" continental
shelf delimitation at 200 meters/50 miles.

Even if all 30

of these nations agreed to this tradeoff, however, considerable other support would be required to gain adoption of the
domestically preferred delimitation.

On the other hand,

sufficient support may well be gained so that the 50-mile
proposal could not gain the required two-thirds majority.
The adoption of a 12-mile territorial sea, incidentally, is not considered contrary to the long term interests
of the United States.

In fact, since national claims to

sovereignty in the sea are becoming more expansive as time
passes, a precise width of 12 miles for the territorial seas
might appear very desirable a decade hence, but it may also
be unattainable at that time.

In supporting the broader

territorial sea, however, the United States should en0ure
that the right of innocent passage is preserved and that
this right be clearly defined to include warships.
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Also,

overflight rights, similar to the rif,ht of innocent passage,
must be included, beyond the three-mile point, in any revision of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
International Impact of an Intermediate Zone or a
Regime for Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the Deep
Seabeds.

The lesser developed nations of the world, which

include the overwhelming majority of sovereign States, can
only derive a short-term economic benefit from the exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed by utilizing the
capabilities of technologically advanced nations.

These

profits may be derived by the lesser developed countries in
the folloWing ways:
1.

They may lease rights to resource exploitation on

their "legal" continental shelves, or within their intermediate zones, to nations which have the necessary technological capability.
2.

They may benefit from deposits to an international

treasury which would result from the exploitative efforts of
a coastal State, or its lessee, within any coastal State's
intermediate zone.

3.

They may benefit from deposits to an international

treasury which would result from the exploitative efforts
of any State, in the deep seabeds, beyond the "legal" continental shelves and intermediate zones.
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The first of the foregoing possibilities, excluding the
intermediate zone, was the sUbject of the analysis of Chapter VI.

On the other hand, the results of that analysis

might be modified if an intermediate zone or a regime for
deep seabed resource exploitation were considered concurrently with a proposal for delimitation of the "legal" continental shelf.
In spite of their considerable appeal, recall that the
200-rneter and 550-meter delimitation proposals of Table V
were rejected due to the likely position of "narrow-shelf"
countries alone. 2

If an intermediate zone, or a regime for

deep seabed resource exploitation, were adopted in conjunction with one of these delimitations, however, "narrowshelf" countries could derive relatively short-term benefits.

That is, they could participate in the profits to be

derived from exploitation of resources located in the seabeds of "wide-shelf" countries, but beyond the "legal"
shelf~

Most of these resources will be economically acces-

sible in the forese0able future and, no matter what State
does the exploitine, payments will be made to an international treasury.

Although "narrow-shelf" countries might

eventually derive more relative benefits from exclusive
rights to resource exploitation in the deep waters adjacent
j
,~

2Se e the discussion on page 53.

to their coasts, if their preferred 50-mile delimitation
were adopted, access to these resources may not be fea$ible
for decades.
It would seem, therefore, that the 200-meter and 550meter "legal" continental shelf delimitations might have
considerable international support if proposed in conjunction with an appropriate intermediate zone or a regime for
the deep seabeds.

This would depend primarily upon the

amount and early receipt of profits to be obtained by "narrow-shelf" countries due to the operations of technologically

c~pable

nations in the various intermediate zones and

the deep seabeds.
It is also well to note, however, that landlocked and
"shelf-locked" States could not derive more benefit from the
adoption of an intermediate zone than from the adoption of a
regime for the exploitation of deep seabed resources alone. 3
A unified effort by these States would only fall one vote
short of defeating an intermediate zone proposal at a future
Law of the Sea Conference. 4

Since overall complexity would

be reduced if the intermediate zone were omitted, many other

J By definition, these States either have no coastline
or cannot claim seabed resource exploitation rights seaward of a water depth of 200 meters because of the proximity of other States.

4The votes that may be cast by the relatively few participating States which are not members of the United
Nations are once again neglected.
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States would probably join the landlocked and "shelf-locked"
States in favoring a "legal" continental shelf in conjunction with a regime for the deep seabeds rather than also
supporting an intermediate zone.
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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND
Conclusion~.

RECOM~:ENI)ATI

ONS

In view of the foregoing analysis of

"legal" continental shelf delimitation, and related matters,
the following conclusions are presented.
1.

The present definition of the "legal" continental

shelf is inadequate because it specifies an outer

b~undary

which is both imprecise and variable and because it satisfies none of the criteria for a suitable "legal" shelf as
set forth in Chapter IV.
2.

Delimitations which best represent domestic inter-

ests, in order of preference, are as follows:

;

a.

200 meterS/50 miles

b.

550 meters/50 miles

c.

550 meters

d.

50 miles

e.

200 meters

.,

3.
-·i

An intermediate zone extending to 2500 rneters/100

miles would be domestically acceptable, in conjunction with
any of the above delimitations, if it were assured that
coastal State rights in the zone were limited to resource
exploitation.
4.

If each member of the United Nations establishes

its position on "legal" continental shelf delimitation on
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the basis of the relative area of seabed to which it will
gain exclusive exploitation rights, the proposals which are
likely to gain substantial international acceptance, in
order of preference, are as follows:

5.

a.

50 miles

b.

200 meters/50 miles

c.

550 meters/50 miles

Consideration of an intermediate zone or a regime

for deep seabed resource exploitation, along with "legal"
continental shelf delimitation, could result in sufficient
international support for a delimitation at 200 meters or
550 meters to make it feasible for one of them to be
adopted.

6.

The United States can probably gain sufficient

support to block a first-vote adoption of the internationally favored 50-mile delimitation by agreeing to support a
12-mile territorial sea proposal.
Recommendations.

In the order of their acceptability

to domestic interests, it is recommended that the United
States act as follows:
1.

Propose or support a revision to the Convention on

the Continental Shelf which would delimit the "legal" shelf
at 200 meters/50 miles.
2.

Support a revision to the Convention which would

delimit the "legal" shelf at 550 meters/50 miles.
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3.

Agree to a 12-mile territorial sea, if such a

trade-off is necEssary, and would be effective, in gaining
adoption of one of the above proposals.

4.

Sup~ort

delimitation at 550 meters in the event

that its adoption becomes feasible.

5.

Support delimitation at 50 miles rather than allow

the present, variable definition to remain in effect.

6.

Support a delimitation as narrow as the 200-meter

water depth, in spite of the position of domestic "wideshelf" interests, in conjunction with an intermediate zone,
or a regime for deep seabed resource exploitation, or both.

7.

Support an intermediate zone extending to 2500

meters/100 miles, in conjunction with any of the above proposals, if it can be assured that coastal State rights in
the zone are limited to resource exploitation.

S. Support the present definition of the "legal" continental shelf if such action is necessary, and would be
effective, in blocking the adoption of a delimi.tation which
is too wide to be acceptable to domestic "narrow-shelf"
interests.
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